This analysis has revealed, first, that the differences outlined in the first chapter are partially responsible for the disagreements between Ockham and Chatton about their theories of reflexive knowledge, in particular, the disagreement that, for Ockham, reflexive knowledge presupposes either an intuitive apprehension or an abstractive apprehension while reflexive knowledge in Chatton’s account presupposes an abstractive cognition and an “experience” of the cognized act. In the second chapter, I analyze the theories of knowledge of Ockham and Chatton considering, especially, the conclusions of the first chapter, but also considering two contemporary theories of knowledge: reliabilism and externalism. This analysis has shown deep differences between Ockham and Chatton’s philosophical anthropologies on the one hand, and on the other hand, between their naturalistic approaches to explain how mental states are caused. In the first chapter of my thesis, I analyze the ontological status of mental states from two perspectives: that of the nature of mental states and that of the way they are caused. This concerns the ontological status of mental states according to Ockham and Chatton. The problem of the introspective cognition of mental states leads to a first question. Chatton has always considered that the content of certain mental states must be accessible immediately. Ockham considered, in his early writings, that the content of some mental states is accessible in a mediate way, and, in his later writings, that some content is accessible in an immediate way. My main hypothesis is that the two theories are distinguished by different explanations for the introspective cognition of the content of mental states. The aim of my research is to reconstruct the theories of Ockham and Chatton on reflexive knowledge and compare them to bring about both the areas of agreement and the points of divergence. The problem of the introspective cognition of our own mental states – or reflexive knowledge – is one of those problems. more William of Ockham and Walter Chatton, two English philosophers from the Fourteenth Century, reflected on several common issues in disparate philosophical perspectives. William of Ockham and Walter Chatton, two English philosophers from the Fourteenth Century, refle. Consequently, in both of their theories of consciousness, the same problem arises: how can the will want something that the intellect ignores? In this paper, I present Chatton and Ockham’s responses to this question, as well as a new reconstruction of Chatton’s theory of consciousness, according to which there are pre-reflexive cognitions. However, with respect to mental acts, Chatton and Ockham endorse the idea that an act of the will does not need any previous intuitive cognition of that mental act. With respect to a present thing extra animam, an act of the will can only be elicited after this thing has been intuitively apprehended, because according to both of these authors, one cannot voluntarily desire something whose existence one ignores. more For Ockham and Chatton, every cognitive process through which one genuinely cognizes a mental state involves a reflexive act and an act of the will. For Ockham and Chatton, every cognitive process through which one genuinely cognizes a mental sta.
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